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Abstract
We study the e¤ect of competition on quality in markets such as health care, long-term
care and education, when providers choose both prices and quality in a setting of spatial
competition. We o¤er a novel mechanism whereby competition leads to lower quality. This
mechanism relies on two key assumptions, namely that the providers are motivated and risk-
averse. Our proposed mechanism can help explain several empirical ndings of a negative
e¤ect of competition on quality.
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1 Introduction
Quality is a key concern for consumers in many sectors such as health, long-term care and
education. Hospitals, nursing homes, schools and universities compete on quality to attract
patients, residents and students. While in some countries prices are typically regulated and
xed, in other countries they are not. In this study we focus on institutional settings where
providers compete both on quality and price. For example, prices are variable in the hospital
sector in the US for patients who are not part of public programmes such as Medicare (for the
elderly) or Medicaid (for the poor). In England, the government recently discussed whether
public insurers should be able to negotiate prices with public hospitals, so that they would
compete not only on quality but also on price. It was ultimately decided not to allow competition
on prices due to concerns that quality may su¤er (a xed price regulation regime has therefore
been maintained; Kmietowicz, 2011). In the UK, France and the US, long-term care institutions
(e.g., nursing homes, residential homes) compete on prices to attract residents in addition to
quality. Universities in the US, and from 2012 in the UK, compete on prices in addition to
quality. In the UK nurseries o¤er di¤erent services in combination with di¤erent prices for child
care, and therefore also compete on price and quality.
In this study we investigate whether competition among providers can lead to a reduction in
quality when providers compete on both quality and price. We do so in a spatial Hotelling-type
model, which is a standard framework for studying quality competition in sectors like health
care or education. We show that competition can reduce quality in addition to prices when two
assumptions hold: i) the provider is motivated and has a genuine concern for quality; ii) the
marginal utility from prots is decreasing. We think that both assumptions are likely to hold
in the type of sectors we have in mind. The rst assumption has been well recognised in the
health economics and motivated agents literature. The second assumption is also reasonable
for providers with concentrated ownership, for liquidity-constrained providers, and for rms and
organisations where control has been delegated to risk-averse managers.1
In our Hotelling spatial set-up we model competition as the equivalent of lower transportation
costs. The existing literature already points out two counteracting e¤ects generated by compe-
1See Section 2 for references and further discussion of both of these assumptions.
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tition. While more competition increases the incentives to supply high quality for given prices,
more competition also reduces the price-cost margin, which, in turn, reduces the incentives to
invest in quality. Ma and Burgess (1993) report that the direct e¤ect of more competition on
quality is exactly o¤set by the indirect e¤ect via lower prices so that overall there is no e¤ect of
more competition on quality. The same result is reported by Gravelle (1999). Thus, the existing
spatial economics literature o¤ers little insight about the determinants of the relative strength
of the two above-mentioned e¤ects. In particular, no specic mechanisms have been proposed
that could produce a negative relationship between competition and quality.2 ;3 We show that
under the two above-mentioned assumptions, a third e¤ect emerges and competition actually
reduces quality. The intuition is that more competition leads to lower prices, which in turn
reduces prots and increases the marginal utility from prots. Being motivated, the providers
work at a negative prot margin and will therefore respond optimally to ercer competition by
reducing quality in order to recover some of the prot losses generated by the price reduction.
Our proposed mechanism might rationalise some of the empirical evidence which nds a
negative relationship between quality and competition. For example, Mukamel et al. (2002)
nd that competition increased mortality from 1982 to 1989 in California; Volpp et al. (2003)
investigate the e¤ect of price deregulation in New Jersey from 1990 to 1996 and nd an increase in
mortality; Propper et al. (2004) and Burgess et al. (2008) nd in England a negative relationship
between competition and quality (a positive relation between competition and mortality rates
for patients with heart attack) when xed-price regulation was not yet introduced and prices
were allowed to vary. Grabowski (2004) nds that competition reduces the quality of nursing
homes in the US.4
2 Model and analysis
Consider a market with two providers located at each endpoint of the line segment S = [0; 1].
Consumers are uniformly located on S with a total mass of one, and each consumer demands
2Using a Salop model, Economides (1993) nds that a higher number of rms leads to lower equilibrium
quality, but this is purely due to a demand e¤ect and not related to competition per se.
3 In a very di¤erent theoretical framework, with monopolistic competition, imperfect information and consumer
search, Dranove and Satterthwaite (1992) show that improved price information might reduce quality provision,
possibly to the extent that welfare is reduced.
4See also Gaynor (2006) for survey on the e¤ects of competion on quality in health care markets.
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one unit from the most preferred provider. The utility of a consumer located at x 2 S and
buying from provider i is given by
U (x) =
8><>: v + q1   tx  p1 if i = 1v + q2   t (1  x)  p2 if i = 2 ; (1)
where v is gross consumer surplus, qi is the quality of provider i, pi is the price charged by
provider i and t is a transportation cost parameter measuring the importance of travelling
distance relative to quality di¤erences.
Each consumer makes a utility-maximising choice of provider, which gives the demand for
provider 1 as
D1 =
1
2
+
1
2t
(q1   q2   (p1   p2)) ; (2)
while demand for provider 2 is D2 = 1   D1. Lower travelling costs make demand for each
provider more price- and quality-elastic. Thus, following the standard practice in the literature,
we will measure the degree of competition in the market by t 1.
Prots for provider i is given by
i = (pi   c)Di   g (qi) ; (3)
where c is the marginal cost of providing the good and g (qi) is the xed cost of quality with
gqi > 0 and gqiqi > 0.
The objective function of provider i is given by
U i (qi; i) : (4)
We make two critical assumptions. First, we assume that providers are motivated and have a
concern about quality: Uqi > 0 and Uqiqi  0. This could be due to altruism or motivation. This
assumption is likely to hold in the health, long-term care and education sectors, as well as other
public sector industries. In the health economics literature, it has long been recognised that
providers (doctors, nurses, health care managers) are, at least to some extent, altruistic.5 This
5See, e.g., Ellis and McGuire, 1986; Chalkley and Malcomson, 1998; Eggleston, 2005; Jack, 2005.
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assumption is also made in the recent literature on motivated agents in the broader public sector,
where the agent is assumed to share, to some extent, the objective function of the principal.6
The main idea is that organisations that provide public (or publicly-provided private) goods have
a mission, and individuals who work in such organisations are mission-orientedor motivated.
Examples given in this literature include doctors and nurses who are committed to improve
health, teachers who care about good learning, and researchers who are committed to expanding
knowledge.
Second, we also allow for risk-averse providers by assuming that U ii > 0 and U
i
ii <
0. There are several reasons why rms or organisations in general might display risk-averse
behaviour, such as concentrated ownership or delegation of control to risk-averse managers
whose remuneration is linked to rm performance. A rms payo¤ function might also be
concave in prots due to liquidity constraints and costly nancial distress. If external nancing
is more costly than internal nancing, the rms marginal value of prots will decrease with the
prot level. Thus, the assumption of decreasing marginal utility of prots might be particularly
relevant for organisations that have small prot margins or that are close to breaking even.7 In
the context of health care markets, which is one of the main applications of the present note,
the assumption of risk-averse hospitals have been used by, e.g., Hodgkin and McGuire (1994),
Mougeot and Naegelen (2008) and Felder (2009).
To keep the analysis simple we assume that U iiqi = 0 since this is not critical for our
main result. We assume that the two providers choose price and quality simultaneously. The
rst-order conditions for the optimal quality and price for provider i are, respectively,
U iqi + U
i
i

pi   c
2t
  gqi

= 0 (5)
and
U ii

Di   pi   c
2t

= 0: (6)
6See, e.g., Francois (2000); Besley and Gathak (2005); Delfgaauw and Dur (2008); Prendergast (2007); Makris
(2009).
7See, e.g., Asplund (2002) and Banal-Estañol and Ottaviano (2006) for further discussions about risk-averse
rms.
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The symmetric Nash equilibrium, denoted by q and p, has quality and price given by8
Uq + U

p   c
2t
  gq

= 0 (7)
and
U

1
2
  p
   c
2t

= 0: (8)
From the optimality condition on price we obtain:
p = c+ t: (9)
Thus, more competition, in the form of lower transportation costs, reduces the price. Substitut-
ing p = c+ t into the condition for optimal quality yields
Uq + U

1
2
  gq

= 0: (10)
What is the e¤ect of more competition on quality? Di¤erentiating (10) with respect to t,
and keeping in mind that equilibrium prot is  = t2   g (q), we derive
@q
@t
=
1
2U
 
1
2   gq

 
h
Uqq   Ugqq + U
 
1
2   gq
2i > 0; (11)
where the denominator is positive by the second-order condition. From (10), notice that 
1
2   gq

=  UqU < 0. Therefore, more competition reduces quality. The intuition for our key re-
sult is the following. More competition generates three e¤ects. First, it makes the demand more
responsive to a marginal increase in quality. For a given mark-up (p   c = t > 0), this e¤ect
tends to increase quality. However, more competition also reduces the mark-up, which reduces
the marginal prot from an increase in quality. These two e¤ects o¤set each other completely.
Under our two critical assumptions, there is however a third e¤ect. More competition reduces
the price, which in turn reduces prots and increases the marginal utility from prots. Since
providers are motivated, the marginal prot of quality is negative in equilibrium (12   gq < 0).
8The second-order conditions are: i) d2U i=dq2i = Uqiqi   Uigqiqi + Uii
 
pi c
2t
  gqi
2
< 0, ii) d2U i=dp2i =
Uii
 
Di   pi c2t
  Ui   1t  =  Ui   1t  < 0; iii) d2U i=dq2i  d2U i=dp2i > 0.
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Therefore, each provider responds optimally to more competition by reducing quality in order
to recover some of the prot losses generated by the price reduction.
Notice the criticality of our two key assumptions. If marginal utility does not decrease with
higher prots, then U = 0 and @q=@t = 0. If the marginal utility is constant, variations in
prots do not a¤ect the relative willingness to provide quality. If the provider is not motivated,
then Uq = 0, 12   gq = 0 and @q=@t = 0. In this case, quality is set to maximise prots so that,
by the Envelope Theorem, a marginal reduction in quality has no e¤ect on prots.
3 Conclusions
The relationship between competition and quality in sectors like health care, elderly care and
education, is a hotly debated policy issue in several countries. While several empirical studies
have found a negative relationship between competition and quality in these sectors, the existing
theoretical literature is lacking in terms of o¤ering precise mechanisms that can explain these
ndings. In this note we have o¤ered one such possible (and novel) mechanism and shown
that this mechanism relies on two key assumptions, namely that the providers are motivated
and risk-averse. For given quality levels, ercer competition results in lower prots due to lower
prices. We have shown that providers with the two above-mentioned characteristics will respond
by lowering their quality in order to recover some of these prot losses.
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